


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CIA/SAVA /w vIND 710417



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 17 April 1971

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1971

Weekly average for each month




JANUARY 1971 - APRIL 1971


Weekly data as reported

**US BATTLE DEATHS**


rose slightly from last week's 42 to 48.

**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS**


increased to 441 after last week's low figure of 287. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE**


stand at one regular, 10 special purpose, and five "gap-fill" groups for a total of 2,672 personnel. The infiltration estimate since 1 October 1970 is now some 58,200 - 60,200.

**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS**


dropped to 639 from the 795 of last week.

**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION**

decreased slightly from last week's 2,894 to 2,791.

**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS**

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces rose one point to 93%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

25X1C

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam decreased during the past week. The Communists are continuing to prepare for "phase two" of their spring campaign, scheduled to begin in late April, but in developing these preparations Communist forces continue to be troubled by logistic and morale problems. No significant enemy reaction to the combined US-ARVN thrust into the A Shau Valley has yet been noted and very little contact has been made since the operation began. The enemy wound down the intensity of his attacks against FSB-6 late in the week and at least some of the enemy elements engaged in those attacks have withdrawn for regrouping. In MR 3, [REDACTED] reports suggest that the Communists will become increasingly aggressive in southern Tay Ninh with local guerrilla and sapper elements attempting attacks against outposts and populated areas. In the Delta, the level of enemy activity continued its steady decline.

In Cambodia, the Pich Nil Pass area of Route 4 and the Chup-Dambe areas in Kompong Cham Province continue to be the focal points of military activity. The FANK operation to clear the Pich Nil Pass has been impeded by Communist attacks by fire and ambush tactics. In Kompong Cham Province, ARVN troops have inflicted heavy casualties on the Communists in a succession of contacts while ARVN losses remained slight in comparison. Elsewhere in Cambodia, military action has been limited to small-scale enemy attacks that caused only light casualties.

Throughout the week, enemy forces in Laos kept steady pressure on friendly positions between the Plain of Jars and the government irregular base at Long Tieng. In the Luang Prabang area, a government task force has had some success northeast of the Royal Capital, but the enemy appears determined to hold the ground it took last month. Elsewhere in Laos, the military situation has been relatively stable, but action in the Muong Phalane area is expected to pick up.

Enemy Infiltration

25X1B

During the past week, one regular, battalion-size and ten small, specially designated groups were detected in southern Laos with a total observed strength of 672. The numerical designator of the regular group, however, indicates that five other groups in this infiltration series have moved through the system unobserved. Acceptance of these "gap-fill" groups [REDACTED] raises the weekly estimate to 2,700 and increases the estimate of personnel moving southward toward Cambodia/South Vietnam since 1 October 1970 to a total of some 58,200 to 60,200.

25X1C

South Vietnam Developments

25X1C

[REDACTED]

President Thieu discussed certain aspects of the forthcoming presidential elections. Thieu told [REDACTED] that he thinks there will be seven or eight candidates but that he will be re-elected with 35 to 40 percent of the vote. [REDACTED]

25X1C

Thieu told [REDACTED] that in a two-man race he thinks he would win 55 percent of the vote to Big Minh's 45 percent, but that if Vice President Ky runs, Minh would win the election. These conversations also indicated that Thieu has not yet decided on a running mate, and that the selection of Ky for this role is unlikely. Ky's recent outspoken public and private criticism of Thieu has done nothing to increase the likelihood of another Thieu-Ky ticket and could constitute the opening salvo in Ky's own campaign for the presidency. Ky is clearly testing the water, though he has probably not made a final decision on whether or not to run.

25X1X7

Communist Developments

[REDACTED]

25X1X7

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